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Abstract Phishing is a prevalent issue in today’s Internet. It can have
financial or personal consequences. Attacks continue to become more and
more sophisticated and the advanced ones (including spear phishing)
can only be detected if people carefully check URLs – be it in messages
or in the address bar of the web browser. We developed a game-based
smartphone app – NoPhish – to educate people in accessing, parsing and
checking URLs; i.e. enabling them to distinguish between trustworthy
and non-trustworthy messages and websites. Throughout several levels
of the game information is provided and phishing detection is exercised
in a playful manner. Several learning principles were applied and the
interfaces and texts were developed in a user-centered design.
1 Introduction
The financial benefit of phishing [1] is an incentive for phishers to keep luring
victims into disclosing their sensitive information. The anti-phishing working
group registered more than 120.000 unique phishing attacks in the first half of
2014, i.e. more than 120.000 impersonated websites [2]. Furthermore, they report
that the average up-time of phishing websites was 32 hours and 32 minutes.
During this time potential victims have to be self-reliant, i.e. they have to check
the URL in order to know whether the destination is trustworthy. People could
be supported by tools such as the Netcraft Extension [3]. However, such tools
can never provide 100% accuracy [4]. Therefore, the tools’ checks need to be
complemented by humans checking the URLs. Yet, many people lack the required
knowledge to properly check URLs [5,6] and assess the trustworthiness of a given
website. Some people are even not aware of faked messages and websites at all
and, thus, are not aware that they should check URLs before providing sensitive
information [7,5].
Several solutions have been proposed to address the problem of lacking knowl-
edge e.g. tutorials or guides [8,9], quizzes [10,11] and games [4,12]. Tutorials are
read-intensive if they cover all the different channels (such as email, SMS, QR
codes, instant messaging, and social media) and URL spoofing tricks phishers
exploit. The quizzes we are aware of do – if at all – indirectly educate people
based on the feedback whether given answers are correct or incorrect; i.e. they
do not explain why answers are correct/incorrect. In addition, they do not cover
all different channels and tricks phishers exploit. The game Anti-Phishing Phyl-
lis [12] only focuses on the email channel. Anti-Phishing Phil 1 and 2 [4,13] are
already rather advanced in terms of different URL spoofing tricks; but can still
be improved by including awareness aspects, addressing different channels, ex-
plaining the structure of a URL more precisely, addressing more categories of
URL spoofing tricks, and providing knowledge about HTTPS.
Our goal1 was to develop a new game – NoPhish – an anti-phishing edu-
cation app that addresses these issues to provide more sophisticated knowledge
on how to properly check URLs – be it in messages or in the address bar of
the web browser. We opted for an Android smartphone app since in partic-
ular smartphone users are much more likely to access phishing websites than
desktop users [14]. The detection of phishing on mobile browsers is complicated
because in many cases address bars disappear and even if shown only parts of
the URL are visible. Furthermore, a smartphone app provides the opportunity
of casual gameplay and thus, compared to desktop solutions, more flexibility and
time-independence. Thanks to the Google Play Game Services it is also possible
for users to compare their performance with others. This adds a supplemen-
tary challenge and a motivational aspect, both key characteristics of gameplay
and therefore successful learning. Furthermore, NoPhish integrates a number of
learning principles recommended by literature.
2 Preliminary Considerations
2.1 Required Skills
Earlier phishing attacks could be detected by checking messages and websites for
spelling and grammar mistakes or for design flaws. But since phishing attacks get
more advanced, the URL is the only reliable indicator for the authenticity and
trustworthiness of messages and websites (note, assuming a non-compromised
system). Correspondingly, the following skills are required to successfully protect
against phishing:
– Being aware that messages, links and websites can be easily impersonated;
– Knowing that the URL is a reliable indicator for the authenticity and trust-
worthiness of a website rather than a website’s content;
– Knowing how to access and view entire URL;
– Knowing how to parse the URL properly;
– Knowing different URL spoofing tricks;
– Knowing the importance of HTTPS when entering sensitive data.
2.2 Target Group
With NoPhish, we address in particular people who lack knowledge regarding
all the aspects listed in Section 2.1; but people who use the Internet frequently.
1 Note, a summary of this paper is availalbe at [31]
We assume that NoPhish users have a general interest in learning to protect
themselves (as they decided to install the app). Furthermore, our target group
are Germans2.
2.3 Learning Focus
URLs can either be checked using the URL preview function (cf. Figure 1)
provided by several email clients and mobile browsers or directly in the mobile
browser’s address bar. We decided to educate people how to check URLs in the
address bar for the following reasons: First, not all applications provide such
a preview function, e.g. Android’s (e.g. version 4.2) standard email client (e.g.
version 4.4.2) does not provide such a preview function. Second, well-crafted
URLs can still deceive users since the preview URLs are cropped in case they
are too long (cf. Figure 1). We are aware that this decision comes with the
disadvantage that users might fall for an attack by clicking on a link already,
e.g. they could download malicious software. This issue is addressed by NoPhish
in the final remarks (cf. Section 3.5).
Figure 1: Screenshot - URL preview function
2.4 Categorization of URL Spoofing Tricks
Phishers apply several URL spoofing tricks. Different tricks should be explained
in different levels of NoPhish. There are several approaches to categorize URL
spoofing tricks [4,6,15]. We propose to use a different categorization; one that is
based on the difficulty to detect the corresponding spoofing trick. Such a catego-
rization is most appropriate for the later leveling. Correspondingly, we identified
the following categories (note, the examples are taken from PhishTank):
a) IP Address URL without Brand: Sometimes phishers do not even bother
registering any domain at all. In this spoofing trick, the host area of the
URL contains an IP address while the path part does not contain the brand
name, e.g. http://5.178.64.164/secure to impersonate PayPal.
2 Note, this has an impact on the language as well as on the selected URLs and the
design of the app.
b) Random/Unrelated/Trustworthy Domain, without Brand: This trick uses
random/unrelated or trustworthy names or strings as domain name3 and
does not include the brand name of the targeted website in any other part of
the URL. E.g. http://www.szuhsa.fr/login.html, http://www.weather.com/
login.html or https://secure-payment.com to impersonate PayPal.
c) Random/Unrelated/Trustworthy Domain, with Brand in Subdomain:
A phisher can include the brand name into the subdomain of a URL in combi-
nation with a random/unrelated/trustworthy domain name, e.g. http://paypal.
mark-chippy.com/account-setup/ or http://www.amazon.account.com/.
d) Random/Unrelated/Trustworthy/IP Domain, with Brand in Path:
A phisher can include the brand name into the path part of a URL in combi-
nation with a random/unrelated/trustworthy domain name, e.g. http://online-
payment.com/www.paypal.com/. This attack can also happen in combina-
tion with an IP address URL, e.g. http://5.178.64.164/paypal.
e) Derivated Domains: A phisher can register a modification of the original do-
main. In this case the modified domain contains the brand name in some
form, e.g. facebook-login.com can be registered in order to impersonate
facebook.com.
f) Introducing Typos: Phishers can register domains which resemble the tar-
geted domain, but have a typo, e.g. the phisher can register micosoft.com to
impersonte microsoft.com. One special case of the typo is swapping letters in
the original domain name, e.g. mircosoft.com to impersonate microsoft.com.
g) Replacing Character(s): A phisher can also exploit character resemblance,
i.e. the phisher can register domains where characters are replaced by other
similar characters, e.g. https://www.arnazon.com.
There are some more URL spoofing tricks which either cannot be recognized
by the human eye (e.g. homograph attacks [16]) or are irrelevant for our setting
because they are redirected URLs such as tiny URLs [17] or cloaked URLs [18].
After succefully completing the last level of the game, some general remarks on
these issues are provided to the users (cf. Section 3.5).
2.5 Learning Principles
This section explains the principles of learning according to [19,20] which are
essential for increased learning performance:
Readiness: The principle of readiness states that motivation is crucial for effec-
tive learning. Note, due to the definition of the target group we assume that
NoPhish users entail readiness.
Exercise: The principle of exercise is composed of two aspects: First, training and
repetition help increase learning. Second, feedback is crucial for good learning
performance. Ideally, these two aspects are applied in combination.
3 Note, that we refer to the first- and second-level domain of a URL as domain.
Effect: The principle of effect states that people who associate their learning
with positive feelings, e.g. early successes, learn more and better while on the
other hand, negative feelings can decrease the learning performance. Correspond-
ingly, enabling early success and maintaining people’s motivation with positive
feedback is crucial for successful learning.
Intensity: The principle of intensity states that learning is encouraged by things
that are more intense. E.g. people are likely to learn more from an exciting and
enthusiastic teacher than from a boring and monotone one or from a text book.
Primacy: The principle of primacy states that the first thing people learn makes
the strongest impression; i.e. it should be started with important content.
2.6 Gamification
The following game elements are used in most modern games [21,22] and are
important for a good game experience:
Lives: An inherent element of a game is the possibility of losing it. If users
are not able to lose a game they have no incentive to win it or play it. At the
same time, one does not want the user to lose the game directly as the result
of one minor mistake. Therefore, most games have some kind of “you have N
tries”-element, which is commonly referred to as lives.
Levels: Leveling serves multiple purposes: First, it is important for the users
to get a feeling for the progress they make. Second, it provides fixed points in
the game from where they can restart or pause and continue the game later on.
Finally, it enables to increase the difficulty of the game with increasing levels.
Achievements: Achievements are special elements of a game that users can un-
lock if they, e.g. find a special object or if they play a certain level exceptionally
well. This is in particular for people who are willing to invest a lot of time in a
specific level in order to finish it perfectly or to find every hidden secret in it.
Leaderboards: A leaderboard is an area where a user can compare the own
progress in the game with the one of other users. The comparison with oth-
ers motivates people to improve skills relevant for the game resulting in better
performance.
2.7 User-Centered Design
The design and implementation of a user friendly and understandable app as
described by Abras et al. [23] is achieved by giving extensive attention to the
users’ needs and wants as early as possible.
3 Game Design
This section elaborates on the game design and explains how the identified as-
pects of Section 2 are addressed.
3.1 Initial Survey
Before elaborating on the app design and implementation we inteded to get an
idea of the users’ preferences with regard to an anti-phishing education app.
Thus, we ran an initial user survey where we asked users whether they would
prefer a rather neutral game or a comic style education game with e.g. a fish
as main character. The results of our survey confirmed previous findings by
Volkamer et al. [24] that for a German audience (adults at least) a rather neutral
game-based approach would be best accepted.
3.2 Learning Content per Part
The app entails two introductory parts, the game with nine levels, and a final
remarks part. Table 1 shows the link between the skills to properly judge on the
trustworthiness of websites (cf. Section 2.1) and the different parts of NoPhish.
Taught Skill Covered in
Awareness of fake messages, links and websites Intro Part 1
Access and view entire URL Intro Part 2
URL as a reliable indicator for phishing attacks Intro Part 2
Proper URL parsing Level 1
Different URL spoofing tricks (cf. Section 2.4) Levels 2-8
a) IP address, no brand Level 2
b) Random/unrelated/trustworthy domain, no brand Level 3
c) Random/unrelated/trustworthy domain, brand in subdomain Level 4
d) Random/unrelated/trustworthy/IP domain, brand in path Level 5
e) Derivated domains Level 6
f) Introducing typos Level 7
g) Replacing character(s) Level 8
HTTPS for entering sensitive data Level 9
Table 1: Skills – Levels – Assignment
3.3 Introduction Parts
After a short introduction to the problem of phishing and its consequences,
NoPhish starts with two introductory parts. The awareness of spoofed messages,
links, and websites can be best addressed by actually sending corresponding
messages and access and view entire URL can be best exercised in the mobile
browser. Thus, these two parts are seperated from the actual levels of the game.
Part 1 - Awareness of Spoofed Messages, Links, and Websites: First, users are
made aware of how simple it is to spoof messages, e.g. emails [25]. This is done
by enabling them to send themselves with the NoPhish app an email from a
sender address they provide in a corresponding form; and with a content they
provide there as well. After submitting the form, NoPhish requests the users to
check their email inbox. The received email contains information that this email
was sent by NoPhish and that users should check the “from field” to notice
that this is actually the email they prepared. Furthermore, the email contains
a link with the displayed text “https://www.google.de/” and users are asked to
follow the link. Clicking on this link redirects the users back to the app. Thereby,
users learn by experience that they should not trust displayed link texts. Back
in the app some further information is provided, e.g. that website spoofing is
simple as well. Finally, the user is informed that this kind of forgery is not only
possible with emails, but also with other forms of communication, such as social
networks, SMS or instant messaging systems.
Part 2 - Access Address Bar and View Entire URL: This part teaches the users
how to access and view the entire URL in the mobile browser. In detail, the
users are told (1) that they need to scroll up the entire website to make the
generally hidden address bar reappear; and (2) that they need to tap the text
field of the address bar and scroll to the left in order to view the entire URL.
The explanations how to do so are supported with corresponding screenshots.
Due to the learning principle of exercise (cf. Section 2.5) after the explana-
tions an exercise follows. Here, users are required to access the URL of a website
they are forwarded to by NoPhish. Note, forwarding happens in a way that users
first have to scroll up. On top of the page, there is a text field, where they are
asked to enter the last four characters of the URL. Then, they are asked to
identify the first word of the URL (check one out of four provided possibilities).
Once submitted the app checks the users’ answers and can thereby ensure that
they managed to access and view the entire URL. The users are forwarded to
NoPhish as soon as they successfully complete the exercise. At the end of the
exercise the users are told that URLs are the only reliable indicator for phishing.
They also learn that they should always access the URL just as learned and that
all other displayed links might be spoofed (by referring to the previous part).
This part closes by explaining that URLs need to be carefully checked and that
they learn how to do so throughout the coming parts of the app.
3.4 Gaming Part
The gaming part is split into nine levels with increasing difficulty. Each level
consists of two parts: an introductory block and the actual exercise. For the in-
troduction of URL spoofing tricks the introductory block consists of a reminder4,
4 Note, this reminder is not shown if the user immediately starts off the new level
after having successfully completed the last one but only if some time passed since
the user played previous levels.
which provides a summary of previous levels (cf. Figure 2(a)) and the introduc-
tion of a new URL spoofing trick (cf. Figure 2(b)).
(a) Reminder (b) New URL spoofing trick
Figure 2: Example introductory block
The exercise is designed in a playful manner, i.e. users start with three lives,
represented by hearts, and can collect points for correct answers and lose points
and lives for wrong ones.
Users receive direct feedback on their decision. If the given answer is correct
the users are rewarded by gaining points and a smiley face. This is relevant for the
increase of positive feelings (cf. learning principle of effect in Section 2.5). If the
answer is wrong the users lose points and a life. The users are immediately told
why their answer was wrong. The next level is achieved if and only if a predefined
amount of phishing and legitimate URLs have correctly been identified.
To simulate the “behavior” of the address bar in mobile browsers, the entire
URL as such is not displayed but only parts of it. The user needs to scroll to the
start of the URL in order to decide about the legitimacy of the displayed URL.
By practicing the learnt content and providing direct feedback we address
the principle of exercise (cf. Section 2.5). Note, by making use of levels and lives
two of the four gamification elements are already addressed (cf. Section 2.6).
The elements achievements and leadersboards are realized by means of Google
Play Game Services. Finally, NoPhish by nature provides intensity (cf. learning
principle of intensity in Section 2.5) as it is a game.
Level 1 - Structure of a URL: It is essential for people to achieve the capability of
parsing a URL properly before learning different URL spoofng tricks. Especially
the identification of the domain (first- and second-level domain) in a given URL
is a key aspect which needs to be covered extensively. Therefore, the users start
learning to identify the domain of a URL in level 1. To explain the different parts,
we do not use technical terms such as URL, domain, subdomain, protocol and
only provide details users need to know to successfully detect phishing URLs.
The focus of this level is the domain, the Who-Section as we refer to it in
NoPhish. During the exercise the users are asked to tap on the Who-Section.
Levels 2-8 - URL Spoofing Tricks: In levels 2-8, the various URL spoofing tricks
(cf. Section 2.4) are addressed. In level 2, we also explain IP addresses by using
the analogy of house addresses (with street names and numbers).
During the exercises, URLs together with the name of the website the users
are supposed to visit are displayed (cf. Figure 3(a)). Users are asked to decide
whether they are legitimate or phishing ones. Note, that in all levels both, HTTP
and HTTPS URLs are displayed to the user, i.e. legitimate as well as phishing
URLs can use HTTPS. This way, we prevent users from deciding based on the
protocol.
When the users correctly identify a phishing URL, NoPhish asks them to tap
on the Who-Section (cf. Figure 3(b)). This way, we aspire to ensure that they
understood where to look at and did not just guess the answer. Depending on the
(a) Exercise - Phish/No Phish (b) Exercise - Show Who-Section
Figure 3: Example Exercise Screenshots
user performance the frequency of asking to tap on the Who-Section decreases
or increases.
Note, in level n the number of URLs that need to be properly judged is
6 + 2 ∗ (n+ 1). The learning principle of repetition (cf. Section 2.5) is applied as
each URL spoofing trick introduced in level n is tested in the exercises of later lev-
els, too. About half of the phishing URLs (more precisesly b(6 + 2 ∗ (n+ 1))/4c
in level n) are repetitions5 from previous levels. The first level that contains
repetitions is level 3 because level 2 introduces the first URL spoofing trick.
Level 9 - HTTPS: In this level, we introduce the difference between HTTP
and HTTPS. We explain, that HTTPS represents the higher security level and
that this means (1) that the conversation cannot be eavesdropped by someone
having access to the network and (2) that the communication partner indicated
in the Who-Section proved his/her identity to a trusted authority if no warning
is shown in the browser.
Furthermore, we tell users that there exist many legitimate websites without
HTTPS (by default). We advice to try to switch to HTTPS. We explain the
consequences if sensitive information is entered on a website without HTTPS
(while assuming that the domain name is authentic). This level also includes an
exercise. However, the question is changed. The users are asked whether they
would provide sensitive information on the website. Thus, the users need to check
whether a URL provides HTTPS and whether the domain name of the URL is
spoofed or not.
3.5 Final Remarks Part
When the users reach the final remarks part they are well prepared for the de-
tection of phishing URLs (cf. Section 2.1). Yet, there are some special cases the
users are made aware of in this part of NoPhish. E.g. users are informed about
further potential URL spoofing tricks that have not been exercised (redirected
URLs and homograph attacks). Also, the users are explained that they might
encounter URLs which look very phishing-like, but actually are legitimate, e.g.
https://www.paypal-community.com. In such a case, NoPhish suggests to di-
rectly contact the company and ask for the authenticity of the specific website,
i.e. URL, before entering any data. Finally, NoPhish briefly introduces extended
validation certificates and provides users with a link to further information on
this topic. This part does not include an exercise.
4 App Development Process
This section gives a brief overview of our approach for the development of a user
friendly and understandable app and summarizes the two most important steps
regarding the development process – URL generation and user-centered design.
4.1 URL Generation
We generate phishing URLs by applying corresponding URL spoofing tricks
to legitimate URLs. For the legitimate URLs 30 of the top 100 Alexa ranked
domains (for Germany) were collected. The corresponding URLs have no path
5 Repetition means that the URL spoofing trick is repeated not the specific URLs.
or subdomain, e.g. google.com. In order to also provide NoPhish users with
longer URLs, we visited each of these websites, navigated through them and
additionally picked three URLs for each domain, two long and one short URL.
Thus, for each domain, a total of four URLs was added to the set of legitimate
URLs. This set contains URLs with and without HTTPS.
For each URL to be displayed it is randomly decided which of the legitimate
URLs is used. Then, it is randomly decided whether to show a legitimate or a
phishing one based on the setting for the corresponding level. For the phishing
URLs the corresponding URL spoofing trick is applied.
4.2 Applied User-Centered Design Approaches
In addition to the initial survey, we involved potential users of NoPhish in the
following ways: we iteratively built, tested, and improved mock ups (while focus-
ing on the first three levels as the app flow does not significantly change from this
level on). For instance, according to comments of participants, we simplified and
clarified the descriptions on how to access the address bar. We also reduced the
text per page in general. The texts for all levels were reviewed by two German
language experts (who are no security experts).
The next step was a user study, where we decided to go for the low cost
method of guerilla user testing [26]; i.e. participants reading the app texts while
thinking aloud. We included a little exercise in order to assess whether the users
comprehended the texts or not, i.e. for each introduced URL spoofing trick we
included a small list of URLs on which the users had to decide whether they
were phishing URLs or not. Finally, the users were asked to provide their general
impression. The received feedback was integrated.
In addition, we applied a statistical method – once we improved the text –
in order to assess the legibility of our texts. Corresponding tools [27,28,29] take
a regular text as their input and return a legibility index as their output. The
average index value of the three tools for the entire text used in the app is 62.
Given a scale from 0 to 100, where an index of up to 30 indicates an academic
level and 90 and above is considered easy to understand, an index of 62 is
considered as reasonably comprehensive for teenagers [30]. Regarding our target
group, this result is reasonable. However, it is something we have in mind for
later user tests to evaluate.
5 Related Work
Section 1 already gives an overview of related work in anti-phishing education.
Here, we especially elaborate on Anti-Phishing Phil 1 and 2 [4,13], as these games
resemble NoPhish the most of all the anti-phishing education approaches.
Anti-Phishing Phil 2 uses a diver as main character (while Anti-Phishing
Phil 1 uses a fish). A major improvement compared to Anti-Phishing Phil 1
is that the game emphasizes the importance of the domain. E.g. the users are
asked to mark the part of a URL which indicates phishing. This is an aspect we
included to NoPhish. Furthermore, the information texts are generally improved
and extended to be more precise.
The design of Anti-Phishing Phil 2 as such could not be applied for our
context due to the results of our initial survey. However, we carefully analyzed
the structure and the educated content to decide what could be adapted and
what we wanted to modify or improve: The provided information, is often not
precise enough and sometimes even inconsistent. In one information text the host
is introduced as the part between “http://” and the first “/” and the domain is
right before the first “/”. In another information text the domain is addressed by
referring to the right hand side of the host area, which could be either only the
top level domain or could also include subdomains. In addition, Anti-Phishing
Phil 2 covers only four URL spoofing tricks (similar to Anti-Phishing Phil 1):
subdomain tricks, IP addresses, domains with hyphens (part of derivated domain
names) and replacing character(s).
The users are asked to decide on only three URLs per level which seems not to
be enough in order to internalize the learnt content according to the principle of
exercise. Also, URL spoofing tricks from previous levels are not repeated which
is essential for good learning performance according to the learning principle of
exercise. Finally, the difference between HTTP and HTTPS is not addressed as
well as the contents of introduction parts 1 and 2 of NoPhish.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In the scope of this work, we have designed and implemented an anti-phishing
education app – NoPhish – in a user-centered design approach. In a playful
manner, users obtain valuable information on how to detect phishing URLs, in
particular on a smartphone. The detection of phishing URLs is realized as a
game, where the user can win or lose points or lives.
We integrated learning principles and diverse gamification elements recom-
mended in literature. In order to provide levels, with increasing difficulty to
detect phishing URLs, we proposed a new categorization of URL spoofing tricks
which we then explain in the different levels.
The app is divided into two main parts: the security awareness and the edu-
cational part. In the security awareness part the user is shown how simple it is
to spoof emails and links by sending themselves a spoofed email with a spoofed
link. In the educational part the user is taught how to access the URL and how
to detect phishing URLs.
We already conducted a user study including a retention study which showed
very promising results [31]. In future, we also plan to assess how such an educa-
tion app can best be distributed. An idea would be to utilize embedded learn-
ing [32] where simulated phishing emails are sent to users. Whenever users fall
for such an email they could be proposed to download the education app. We
also plan to extend the target group and consider kids and youth.
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